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ABSTRACT – The industrial development level proposed in this essay is the key factor to explain 
how Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) impact may turn from positive to negative. It is shown that, the 
role of FDI inflows in host countries’ growth will be effective for those applying not only the right 
policies, but also raising their local aggregate industry level up from a certain threshold (without 
necessarily applying home country content policies). Interaction between industrial development level 
and FDI may also be considered to be the second and long term effect of the FDI on a country’s 
growth. Hence, when lacking or too weak, industrial development level may be crushed by FDI, 
turning the interaction from positively impacting on growth to play the malign role, and then 
explaining why in some countries FDI appear negatively related to local development. 
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Introduction 
What the matter with FDI impact is? That’s a question worthy of interest; many works 
have been published about the effects of FDI in the host countries.  Although those studies 
cover numerous different countries, doubts and questions still remain concerning the real 
impact of foreign investments in emerging and developing countries. Hypotheses differ 
greatly about the ways to earn a positive impact from FDI. For instance, Blomstrom et al. 
(1994) writing about the effect of FDI in host countries, argue that: „ a positive growth-effect of 
FDI may be real whether the country is sufficiently rich”2. Following the argument of the 
previously quoted authors, poor countries are excluded from having any positive impact 
from FDI in their development. A sizable number of studies are discussing these issues, but 
their findings diverge either in their conclusions, or in the theoretical background relative to 
the impact of foreign investment in less developed countries. It may not be surprising within 
the field of economics to disagree on concepts or theories; in the present case it is assumed 
that countries lacking capital to boost their development should benefit from long - term 
capital flows coming from abroad.  In the main two opposing concepts or approaches, in the 
                                                     
1  Pierre Eric Mani, eric.mani@gmx.com 
2 Duyster, Nguyen, Patterson, Sander (2009) “Foreign Direct Investment absorptive capacity” 
https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/35267/1238510767_HN.pdf;jsessionid=A514B1099F
E67A027DAEE69A39DC003F.smart1?sequence=1 
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economic literature for the impact of FDI, the first one which predicts positive effects is 
known as Benign, and the second, malign is completely the contrary, seeing FDI as a problem 
for the country’s welfare. We also underline the fact that the present essay does not cast on 
the impact of FDI in host countries, we stressed on a particular factor: that the industrial 
development level is the missing link that might explain the discordance between facts and 
theory. This variable must be integrated into the system to better appreciate the FDI impact 
on a developing country’s growth for instance, and should be criterion enabling to conclude 
to a positive or a negative impact. A closed idea was put forth by Carkovic and Levine (2002) 
about a certain „interaction term from income per capita and FDI”3, that enabled them rejecting 
the earlier above assumption by Blomtsrom et al.(1994). For empirical tests, we apply the Net 
Outward Investment position model of Dunning and use it as a proxy for the aggregate 
industrial development. Time series models are applied for each country after carefully 
specifying their features. The results show a positive and significant impact of both related 
FDI variables for Turkey, while Egypt and Morocco failed in showing any positive and 
significant impact. The findings are in accordance with theoretical development arguing that 
countries with a high industrial development level are more suitable to get FDI impacts. 
 Our essay is articulated as it follows, the first part discusses briefly the concepts of 
benign and malign FDI, and then, the second part introduces the concept of aggregate 
industrial development, and presents the Net Outward Investment approach used to proxy 
industrial development, finally part three and four present the empirical estimations and 
discuss the economic meaning of the results. 
The two main approaches about FDI impact 
The section focuses on both concepts below for a brief presentation of their meaning and 
in order to underline some misunderstandings in their use. The benign and more classical 
approach is presented first, thereafter the malign approach follows. 
The Benign approach 
International trade theories fail in their endeavor to position FDI against trade. FDI was 
often considered to be a substitute for trade, but recent findings have shown a more 
complementary relationship between them, to the point that trade openness was proved to 
be relevant as a determinant for FDI flows in some cases. Impacts of trade openness and FDI 
are two subjects still under discussion, particularly for poor countries. When asking about 
the impacts of FDI in the host countries, one refers indirectly to the impact of trade 
openness, since a complementary relationship between them has been proven. Models often 
analyze trade and investment together; for instance the Neo-institutional model predicts 
three mechanisms will benefit from trade and investment4. We borrow the second of the three 
mechanisms which states that: „trade and investment are expected to create positive externalities 
                                                     
3 Wan X.(2010)  “A literature review on the relationship between foreign direct investment and Economic 
growth” International Business Research, vol 3, N°1, Jan. 2010 
4 For more information see Matthias Beck and Nataliya Acc-Nikmehr (2007) “The failed promise of 
foreign direct investment:some remarks on ‘Malign’ investme nt and political instability in Former 
Soviet States” page 10 
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which extend to a process where the introduction of new products and processes by foreign firms 
creates spillovers for the domestic economy” (Teece, 1977)5. This affirmation may implicitly 
assumes that processes to capture externalities from FDI are automatic or autonomous, but 
there was formerly no such a thing in most for poor countries. The economic literature 
acknowledges the fact that a positive effect of FDI can be found, but such effects follow 
different mechanisms to impact on a country’s development. Following that logic, Borenstein 
et al. (1998) proposed „a threshold of human capital” as one such mechanisms conducive to 
positive FDI effects. Although in many cases empirical findings tend to confirm the earlier 
proposition, it may still be stressed that a specialized human resource on particular fields is 
what foreign multinationals are often looking for. Firms themselves are the institutions 
which create the need for that specialized human capital and often invest in interior training; 
by so doing, they anticipate host country governments’ action in creating centers for 
specialized training. The case of central and eastern European countries integrated into the 
European Union clearly illustrates the point. Studies show that those countries earlier in 
their integration process already had an significant pool of human resource, but the labor 
forces’ background could not make them useful enough for foreign investor operators, 
thereby turning the effect a little bit less important mechanism for catching FDI effects6. A 
second reason could be that, since FDI in less developed countries mainly focuses on 
assembly activities, human capital may not be of a relevant importance because employment 
in such activities doesn’t need any particular skill (according to the center-periphery 
outsourcing model).The misunderstanding in the benign FDI’s case is solely within the use 
of the concept. Mechanisms explaining the positive impact of FDI on countries are 
considered to be „stylized facts”. Unfortunately within the analysis, countries’ idiosyncrasies 
are not taken into account. 
Moran (1998) wrote that „perhaps the most prevalent version of the beneficial 
conceptualization begins with a stylized description of how FDI may help the host country 
to break out of the vicious cycle of underdevelopment”7 The same author continues with a 
clear description of what he means by stylized facts, according to the latter description, he 
assumed that „under reasonably competitive conditions-which the foreign presence will 
enhance- FDI should raise efficiency, expand output, and lead to higher economic growth in 
the host country”. The Question here then is whether the FDI fall to enhance competition, 
should there be any positive effect on the local market structure? The main problem in this 
theoretical concept is that even as FDI assets are taken for granted. Yet, multinational firms 
are not eager to share their competitive advantage or their technologies with local firms. In 
addition, according to the multinational theory, foreign investments are motivated by market 
imperfections because they are able to garner advantages from those imperfections, thanks to 
their interior resources and capabilities. Therefore, multinationals will tend to create more 
imperfections in the market in order to weaken competition. FDI is designated wherever it 
goes to make profits for their owners, so the impact they will have on a country depends on 
                                                     
5 Teece (1977) is quoted by Matthias Beck and Nataliya Acc-Nikmehr (2007) in page 10 
6 Although less than expected, a certain positive impact of FDI in central and eastern European 
countries have been found. Those countries still trail the European 15 group countries concerning the 
assumed convergence which was told to be boosted by foreign investments. 
7 Moran T. H. (1998) Foreign Direct Investment and development. Page 19 
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different factors, obviously linked to the theoretical conceptualization which proposes them, 
and specific to countries (between rich and poor countries, the effects of FDI tend to differ. 
For the former they are often positive, but for the latter they are either positive or negative 
according to the country specificities). The conventional theory believes that, the FDI impact 
should be positive because they will increase country capital accumulation, they will 
increase currencies reserve, increase demand for workers and then may result in an increase 
of wages, and finally may drive poor countries to converge. In the aftermath of this 
somehow naïve belief of theory about the positive impact of FDI, the next paragraph 
discusses the opposed effects and its conceptual misunderstanding. 
The malign approach 
This section focuses on the negative effects that FDI are supposed to have on the host 
countries’ development. As stated previously, foreign multinational assets are not granted to 
the host countries. However since these countries are supposed to benefit from the 
investments, the way those benefits should be raised is the real problem in which most 
theoretical conception are rooted when evaluating the malign side of FDI. In the economic 
literature, two main approaches try to show how expectations of welfare from FDI could 
turn from positive to negative. They underlined the negative impact of government policies 
in developing countries, when trying to keep control over foreign investments (Moran, 1998). 
On the one hand, Moran (1998) shows that, within the neoclassical concept8 of promoting 
FDI, industrial sectors which are attracting foreign investor will receive subsidies from the 
government for exports („ export requirement strategy”), while other sectors will progressively 
fall. Although the other hypothesis9 behind the idea remains questionable, the neoclassical 
framework may in some ways be assumed to cause the negative impact by promoting the 
development of some sectors only. In those countries, resource sectors are emerging, while 
overall country welfare often decreases in the course of time. In such situations, the view that 
FDI effects on the host countries are negative may be justified. On the other hand, Moran 
(1998) again introduces the „ strategic – trade framework ”, which differs from the previous 
analysis’ hypothesis. In this case, imperfect competition is assumed, and government policies 
may be to focus on local „infant- industry”. The „infant-industry” needs protection against 
foreign investors, but Moran’s question was about the choice of the industrial sector on 
which to focus; governmental policies under imperfect competition assumption are not 
targeted towards foreign investments. In such an environment, cooperation relations 
between foreign subsidiaries and local industries are not promoted; externalities and 
spillover effects should be difficult to catch. This strategy cannot help developing countries 
to close the technological gap; therefore, they will not be able to escape from the malign 
effect of FDI because of their weak competitiveness. The country’s development will not be 
possible as a consequence of the above inconvenient policies. The whole subject of host 
countries policies toward foreign investor is well known under the expression of „Domestic 
content requirement” that have also been denounced by Moran(1998) and the conventional 
theory, considered to be inefficient. 
                                                     
8 The concept is based on the perfect competition assumption. 
9 The hypothesis is that “production costs in the local market must be higher than world prices” this 
hypothesis shouldn’t be a motivation for foreign investor to locate in developing countries. 
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Another important point that may wipe out the positive effects of FDI to negative in host 
countries is „the repatriation of benefit”(Beck and Acc-Nikmehr, 2007 and Moran, 1998). 
Unfortunately not much has been said about this point. Nevertheless, it is well known 
from the macroeconomic theory that the balance of payment will be impeded along the way 
by such practices, finally turning developing countries from capital importers to capital 
exporters. Repatriating Profits is not an isolated event; on the contrary, such practices could 
be seen as a consequence of the „vanishing of investment opportunities” (or poor investment 
opportunities) in less developed countries, due to the absence of local demand, inadequate 
policies and to the lack of sustainable growth of the host industrial environment, this is the 
incapacity of host countries to absorb FDI stocks. 
The misunderstanding in the malign approach of FDI most of times is also rooted on 
chosen hypotheses. Many analyses already view FDI itself as negative. For instance, Beck 
and Acc-Nikmehr (2007) underlined that Moran implicitly hypothesized (in an analysis) that 
„ rather than contributing to institutional development and productivity, certain types of FDI have 
the potential to undermine existing institutional growth trajectories and, in so doing, forestall future 
economic growth and development”10. Radical views on the impact that foreign multinationals 
will have on host countries’ development are critical. Mainguy (2004)11 said that the malign 
view of FDI impact is from Marxist analysis, according to which, capital will be accumulated for 
capitalists only, so the repartition of activities in industrial sectors is affected, because of the 
technology dependence of host countries. For Marxist analysts, FDI appears to be a continuity of 
imperialism with a different form, and the location in „extra-capitalists” countries is obviously 
negative. Here below, we quote some cases of empirical studies to illustrate how they dealt 
with the problem of FDI impacts. 
Empirical survey of FDI impacts 
This paragraph describes how FDI impacts have been analyzed in less developed 
countries, with examples of some countries that will be studied in the empirical work. Until 
now studies appraising FDI impacts outline some common characteristics. In particular, they 
outline the possibility for a double impact, direct and indirect impact. They also show that 
those impacts are country specific; that is to say the mechanisms by which FDI will impact 
differ from country to country or group of countries. 
There are studies that attempt to measure the impact within econometric models 
including more than a single variable (FDI flows or stocks and other variables) that affect 
economic growth, but there are also studies that try directly to search the causality, if any, 
between FDI and country growth. In our samples of countries, Turkey has often constituted 
a case study. Bilgiç (2007) analyses the export-led growth strategy of Turkey from FDI. 
According to him, in 2005 Turkey was ranked 23rd largest exporter. However, the export 
effect was quickly compensated for by an increase in the imports of intermediate goods. Such 
                                                     
10 Beck and Acc-Nikmehr (2007) “The failed promise of foreign direct investment: some remarks on ‘Malign’ 
Investment Political Instability  in Former Soviet Union” 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/3471/2/beck12007.pdf Page 16-17 
11 Mainguy C. (2004) « l’impact des investissements directs étrangers sur les économies en développement» 
Revue Région et développement n°20 -2004 
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goods represented 60% of the total amount of import of the country (Bilgiç, 2007). In his 
empirical test for the FDI impact on growth, he found a positive and significant impact of 
FDI in the growth of Turkey despite the huge amount of imports. In another test for causality 
between FDI and growth, however, he found that FDI was not a Granger cause of growth in 
Turkey, which means FDI might not cause growth, however, they still have a certain impact 
on enhancing growth possibilities. Other studies confirm these results such as Johanson 
(2008) and Hisarciklilar, Kayam, Kayalica and Ozkale.12 In a 2010 report on Morocco from 
OECD, the flows of FDI are characterized as „reflecting the opportunities offered by the 
privatization programme13”  
There is a lack of case study of FDI impact in Egypt and Morocco, although their case is 
briefly included in the study of Hisarciklilar, Kayam, Kayalica and Ozkale. When a 
causality test is conducted for many Mediterranean countries, the results for Egypt and 
Morocco show that FDI do not cause economic growth. With the imports picture showing a 
striking rise to $130 billion in 2006 from $8 billion in 1980 (Emrah Bilgiç, 2007) , Turkey’s case 
helps to emphasize the necessity for host countries to dispose of an industrial development 
level capable of supplying foreign multinational needs for intermediate goods. As we can see 
in the below graphics, FDI flow in some countries may not be enough to drive economic 
growth. Quick observations among the three countries indicate a large gap of the total flows. 
Turkey shows a very different picture as the increase of flows after 2004 is almost five times 
higher. The pick of FDI inflows in Turkey which seems to be the same in Egypt have reached 
more than $20 billion in 2007 while in Egypt it was only $12billion followed by a nonstop 
decrease and finally divestment after 2010. Morocco seems to follow a different logic mostly 
because of the low amount of FDI inflows and also because they are correlated with the 
country privatization program which begun in 1994. We also pictured out the importance of 
the FDI stocks in the national economy, reporting the FDI stocks to the national GDP. The 
corresponding graphic shows a very different picture with the two small economies (Egypt 
and Morocco) having the best percentage. FDI stocks in Morocco hit the highest level, 
weighing more than 51% of total GDP in 2007. 
                                                     
12 Here is illustrated a case of benign FDI, despite a deeply unfavorable trade balance the above 
studies show a significant impact of FDI on Turkey’s growth. Their findings are based on the 
neoclassical concept of stylized effects of FDI in host countries. 
13 OECD (2010), "The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Morocco's Economic Development", in 
OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Morocco 2010, OECD Publishing. 
doi: 10.1787/9789264079618-3-en  pp 5 
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Graphic 1. FDI flows per country14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 For scale’s matter we rather present each country with a different graphic 
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Graphic 2. FDI stocks reported to GDP for each country 
 
 
The aggregate industrial development level concept 
We assume that foreign investments are not only oriented to natural resources, and that 
foreign multinationals apply a vertical division of labor to include poor host countries in the 
production process of some parts of their final products. Here is another relevant issue for 
countries which is related to the nature of the incoming foreign Direct Investment. Efficiency 
oriented FDI may be less beneficial than import substitute FDI, in the sense that the content 
for the former is mostly poor, resulting in restricted technology transfer and low value added 
by host countries, while the latter are supposed to bring green field subsidiaries whose 
production will be destined for the local markets. Following the first inflows of FDI into the 
host countries, some authors observe an initial positive impact on Balance of Payments. The 
role of government policies appear then to be of relevant, because they will try to increase 
the positive effects brought about by the initial flows of FDI. This phenomenon should be 
seen as the first expected impact that FDI has on the host country’s development, by focusing 
on the export led development strategy. Some studies show that unfortunately this impact in 
developing countries last for a very short term (Hossai, 2005)15, because foreign investors 
quickly turn to increasing their imports to fill the need for incremental exports. The reason 
this happens is that foreign multinationals need „intermediate goods and services” that cannot 
often be supplied within the host countries, mostly because of the non existence of a 
competitive sector that could produce these intermediate goods. Evidence and lessons may 
be taken from west European Multinationals when extending their activities into nearby 
countries.  
The success of FDI in Hungary for example is not just related to the proximity parameter, 
but it is most due to the availability of local suppliers to respond promptly and accurately to 
the needs for intermediate goods. The same success was not seen either in Greece or in 
                                                     
15 Hossain M. A. “Impact of direct investment in Bangladesh’s balance  of Payments: some policies 
implications” PN 0805 
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Morocco, Egypt or Tunisia. West European companies present a good example since the 
strategies they have adopted to extend their activities into nearby destinations focused 
mostly on Mergers and Acquisitions, meaning that similar companies existed at the host 
countries, but with certainly a different technological frontier. It seems misleading to 
conclude that the impact of FDI on poor countries can solely be appraised from the stylized 
facts, showing that, the first impacts on economic growth from FDI may last quickly. The real 
FDI impact measured in empirical work matches only with the short term. Focusing solely 
on the latter impact may drive us to an underestimation of the full FDI impact, whether 
positive or negative. In the extraction of natural resources, foreign investors seldom face 
competition in developing countries, because of huge amounts of investments that constitute 
an irreversible barrier to entry for local industries.16 But when applying a vertical division of 
labor, it is assumed that host countries will be able to supply some intermediate goods and 
services. Yet, the host countries capacity to supply foreign investor needs is conditioned by 
the presence of initial industrial development (not necessarily with a strong local content 
policy) before the foreign entry, which will match with FDI to sustain a positive impact. 
Once a high level of industrial development is controlled, we then assume that 
cooperation relations have been established between foreign multinationals and the local 
industry. In such a case, FDI must have a second impact by interacting with the local industry, 
which will be supplying the intermediate goods and services, thereby diminishing the 
amount of imports. The export-led development strategy will be successful in this case, and the 
host country welfare promoted. For macroeconomic purposes, the use of the industrial 
structure may not be appropriate; if such is the case, we then substitute a more aggregate 
variable, for it one which takes into account the entire industrial development level and its 
international competitiveness. Moran (1988)17 stresses that „how competitive the industry and 
the economy are where the FDI takes place” is important to understand the „interaction between 
FDI and host country development”. The interaction of both FDI and aggregate industrial 
development offers more opportunities for sustained growth in developing host countries. 
Whether or not a host country lacks such a threshold of industrial development the expected 
positive impact from FDI slumps, and finally vanishes. 
The key role of the industrial development level is to interact with FDI in a way that will 
enhance the expected impacts of foreign multinational activities. A host country with a high 
level of industrial development is more likely to benefit from FDI. In the case of less 
developed countries, strong industrial development of the local industry is necessary 
because it will contribute to enhancing the technological composition of FDI, and 
strengthening the ability of the local industry to learn by reaping externalities from FDI, then 
                                                     
16 We have recently witnessed a situation in Cameroon where a Korean company claimed to have 
discovered an important stock of diamond, which however were already extracted by local villagers 
with very poor and inefficient means. Despite the local opposition, this part of the country has been 
conceded to the Korean company. In the aftermath of this concession, local villagers still wait to see 
the social benefits of this huge investment. The first accreditation of these diamonds should be issued 
this year to allow their commercialization. 
17 Moran, T. 1988. Foreign Direct Investment and development. Chap. 1, page 21. 
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resulting in the expected competitive market. Picciotto (2003)18 showed in her study that, 
when subcontracting relationships exist between the foreign multinationals and local 
industries, the former often transfers some technologies the latter needs to supply 
intermediate goods responding to the multinational standards. The ability to understand the 
foreign technology requires some strong initial level of industrial development that 
developing countries lack in most cases. Host countries should have promoted their own 
industrial development before allowing foreign entrance in their local markets. For empirical 
purposes, the industrial development level is modeled below. 
Dunning’s IDP model as a proxy for industrial development level 
The convergence hypothesis among its main principles suggests that, poor countries 
should be able to duplicate production methods and technologies, and that their rate of 
diminishing capital return is slower than in developed countries. This hypothesis will barely 
hold as long as all the mechanism to enable host countries reaping benefits from FDI will not 
clearly be identified. The aim while trying to draft of a model of the level of industrial 
development of poor countries is to find the best proxy to be used as a variable in 
econometric models. The best proposition to fit the needs must be a macroeconomic variable, 
one that shows the strength of competitiveness in the host country’s industry. Those 
hypotheses exclude the possibility for the local country’s domestic capital stock to be used as 
a proxy despite fitting one of the conditions. The model chosen for this study is the 
Investment Development Path (IDP) first proposed by Dunning (1981). This approach 
introduces the Net Outward Investment (NOI) position of a country as the difference 
between the outward FDI stock and the inward FDI stock of a country. 
The proxy for industrial development level will be the NOI, particularly because it fits 
both previous criteria well. An important particularity is that this variable comes from an 
evolutionary approach, which stipulates that: „with an economic development, a country’s NOI 
faces different stages”19. It means that both capabilities, either to attract foreign investment or 
to become a foreign investor in other countries depend upon the economic growth of the 
country. Dunning (1981) proposed five different steps followed by countries either as an FDI 
destination or as an outward investor. The industrial development level will not follow any 
steps; however, it should be influenced by those steps in a certain way. On the one hand, 
countries that demonstrate the first step comply with the original model simply FDI 
destination, without any outward investment because of their low level of development. 
That group of countries will expect only the first impact of FDI, in their balance of payment, 
capital accumulation and employment, and will receive less impact from FDI, sometimes 
showing mitigate conclusion in empirical studies20. On the other hand, less developed 
countries evolution is confined to the second step because of their weak internal market 
growth. They are characterized by a broad negative NOI. 
                                                     
18 Piccioto B. «L’investissement direct vers les nouveaux adhérents d’Europe Centrale et Orientale ce 
que l’élargissement pourrait changer», Notre Europe 2003. 
19 Mold A. (2004)“The investment development path hypo thesis : evidence from the 
Portuguese case-A panel data Analysis” page 3 Revue Region et Développement n° 20 
20 Should we remember for example the mitigate conclusion of empirical researches over North Africa 
commercial openness with European Union Members? 
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The problem with using NOI as a proxy for industrial development level is that the focus 
is confined to a set of industries only: those that are internationalized. However, that set of 
industries sheds light on the competitiveness of the host countries, and should be seen as a 
comparable macroeconomic feature. In fine, the model to be estimated in the study takes the 
following form for each country: 
(1)  
The variable  represents the logarithm of GDP in current prices at time t;  represents a 
set of independent variables at time t, while   is the error term. 
(2)  (This is t original definition by Dunning) 
(3)  
 is assumed to capture the interaction between the inward FDI and the host 
country industrial development level. 
 means the outward flow of foreign investment and  is the inward 
foreign investment, while  is the Net Outward Investment position, as defined in the 
model by Dunning  
In order to arrive at the best estimations of the regression, we add two more control 
variables into regression. The first one commercial, and the second the percentage of tertiary 
enrolment, both variables are very none in the model to enhance FDI effects. The proxy for 
commercial openness is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP values. 
The final regression to be estimated is the following: 
(4)     
Where   
This is a time series model and the specification will depend on the quality of the data we 
have from each country. That is we cannot assume what the best estimator will be for each 
country, but the simplest one may be the Ordinary Least Square (OLS). We intend to study 
the quality of the data first through analysis of stationary hypothesis. Accordingly one 
specific model will be specified for each of the country.  
Empirical work and economic meaning of the results. 
Data for the empirical work have been collected from two sources; the World Bank 
provided data for exports and imports that was used to compute the commercial openness 
observations, the tertiary education enrolment in percentage of total school enrolment, and 
the Gross Development Product (GDP). The UNCTAD database provided data for both 
inward and outward FDI stock. The sample period is from 1980 to 2011. The inward FDI data 
are convert with the logarithm for two main reason, first to control for non stationary 
variance, and secondly to avoid eventual collinearity with the generated observations for 
. 
Before processing to the stationary test, we first selected the optimal lag number for each 
variable. This simple process has the advantage that, while running the stationary test, we 
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will know exactly the limit of lags for the variable, and will then be able to progressively 
them from zero to the optimal, as long as the presence of the unit roots hypothesis will not be 
rejected. The best way to get the optimal lag to assess the series using information criterion 
procedures. The commonly used are Akaike’s information criterion, Schwarz’s information 
criterion, and Hannan and Quinn information criterion. The common assumption is that the 
optimal lag is the one predicted by the three information criterion. The maximum number of 
lags introduced for each case is 3. 
 
Table 1. Lag’s selection test result (with maxlag(3)) 
 
 Turkey Morocco Egypt 
 #lags    #lags #lags 
lngdp 1      1 1 
lnfdi 2      1 3 
school 3      1 1 
cop 1      3 2 
fdinoi 3      1 3 
 
The next step in this empirical work is to run stationary tests, we choose to use Phillips-
Perron unit-roots test, which is robust21 related to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller. 
We folowed the three steps for the unit-roots test starting with the regression integrating 
a trend, then regression with a constant, and then regression without constant and trend. The 
null hypothesis of no unit-root has not been rejected for each variables. The test were run 
with the lags from zero to the maxlags as suggested from the above table. We run the test 
again after first differencing the variables, the results show that all our variables are 
stationary, that’s is I(0), or the unit-roots hypothesis was accepted. 
 
Table 2. Phillips-Perron stationary test results 
 
 Turkey Morocco Egypt 
 Unit root Unit  root Unit root 
Lgdp I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Lfdi I(1) I(1) I(1) 
School I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Cop I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Fdinoi I(1) I(1) I(3)22 
 
Once the variables are differentiated (using the first differences), we first check for any 
possibility of cointegration among variable. This step is necessary since we have the 
variables for Turkey and Morocco showing the same level of integration I(1). The 
                                                     
21 The robustness of the test relies on the general form of heteroskedasticity (robust to serial 
autocorrelation), and that users may not feel obliged to specify the numbers of lags 
22 We had some particular troubles with this variable, as it shows an I(3). 
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cointegration hypothesis assumed that there is a long term relationship that always sends 
back the variables to certain equilibrium. This relationship shows that if a set o variables 
(dependant and independent variables) show the same level of integration like those in our 
specification, there might be a vector of their difference showing an inferior level of 
integration. For the purpose of this study we follow the two-step Engel-Granger test. 
First step: determination of the residual for each country before the differentiation. 
For this step, we run a simple OLS model before the first difference of the variable, and 
we predict residuals, for each of the countries. The estimated OLS model and determination 
of predicted residuals appear below. 
 
 
Second step: After the prediction of the residual, the next step is to run the Dick-Fuller 
test to check for unit-roots hypothesis. If the null hypothesis is rejected, that is the residual is 
I(0), then we have a case of cointegration, and we must run a model of error correction 
integrating a lagged predicted residual as explanatory variable. If this variable in the final 
model is significant negatively, the model specification is good; otherwise we have to run a 
different model. 
 
Table 3. Dfuller test for predicted residual 
 
Turkey Z(t) 
5% 
value 
p. value 
 
Morocco Z(t) 
5% 
value 
p. value 
Lag 1    Lag 0   
Trend  -2.067 -3.580 0.5647  Trend  -4.331 -3.580 0.0028 
Const -2.243 -2.986 0.1909  Const -4.366 -2.986 0.003 
Nocons -2.288 -1.950 -  Nocons -4.441 -1.950 - 
 
We use the same above technique to determine the suitable number of lags. Results for 
each country are shown in individual table. 
Turkey shows a stationary predicted residual, for the regression with no constant. We can 
see that the Z(t) value (-2.288) is smaller than the critical value at 5% (-1.950). We will then 
apply a model of error correction, with expectation that it will meet the above condition that 
is the lagged predicted residual must be significant negative. 
For Morroco, all the Z(t) value reject the null hypothesis of unit-roots, meaning we have a 
second case of error correction model, since the predicted residual here is also stationary. 
For Turkey and Morocco, the model that will be used here is the following: 
 
(5) 
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Where   is the lagged predicted residual for the error correction model.  
The following tables contain the results for Turkey and Morocco. We have checked for 
possibility of residual autocorrelation by performing the Breusch-Godfrey test. This test 
happens in steps. 
Step1: We run a normal OLS estimation and we predict the residuals. 
Step2: We run an auxiliary OLS regression using the predicted residuals as dependent 
variables, and including one lag of the residual in the regression as independent variable. 
Then we have to compute the statistic (R²*N)23  and compare to the Chi-squared statistics at 
5%. If the computed value is greater than the Chi-squared statistic, then the null hypothesis 
of no residual autocorrelation can be rejected. Following the results of the tests, both 
regressions will be estimated using the Prais-Winsten estimator of time-series, with AR (1), 
as the tests show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelation of residuals. We 
have reported the test’s statistics in bold into the small tables. 
 
Table 4. Test output and Prais-Winsten estimation for Turkey 
 
scalar list N R2 NR2   Turkey Robust R²=0.4830     
N = 31    Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
R² = .51802003    .5427158 .1099069 4.94 0.000 
NR² = 16.058621    .0051867 .0017515 2.96 0.007 
. scalar chi15=invchi2 (1, .05)   .0060775 .0130094 0.47 0.644 
. scalar list chi15    -.1722078 .050429 -3.41 0.002 
chi15 = 3.8414588    -. 302232 .1300224 -2.05 0.029 
   _cons .0664891 .0261755 2.54 0.018 
 
As expected, we see the lagged residual significant and negative here which means our 
model is correctly specified. 
 
Table 5. Test output and Prais-Winsten estimation for Morocco 
 
N = 29  Morocco Robust R²=0.4970   
R² = .42702798   Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
NR² = 12.383811   Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
. scalar chi15= invchi2 (1, 
.05) 
 
 .1699077 .240335 0.71 0.487 
. scalar list chi15   -.0401275 .022467 -1.79 0.087 
chi15 = 3.8414588   -.0002511 .008114 -0.03 0.976 
   .0295516 .0227886 1.24 0.227 
   -.7018424 .1703423 -4.12 0.000 
  _cons .040329 .0236139 1.71 0.101 
 
                                                     
23 R² is from the auxiliary regression, and N is the number of observation 
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We can also do the same earlier remark that the lagged residual is significant negative, 
confirming that the model for Morocco is also well specified. 
The regression for Egypt can now be estimated with the normal OLS method. But our 
first estimation looks very poor as the P-value is very higher than 5%.  
We can easily see that computed statistic NR² (0.18097813) is inferior to the Chi-squared 
value, which means we can accept the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of residuals. 
 
Table 6. test output and GLM estimations for Egypt 
 
scalar list N R² NR²  Egypt Robust    
N = 28   Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
R² = .0064635       
NR² = .18097813   .0025285 .0017015 1.49 0.137 
. scalar chi15=invchi2 
(1.05) 
 
 -.0516638 .0269838 -1.91 0.056 
. scalar list chi15   -.0035651 .0051928 -0.69 0.492 
chi15 = 3.8414588   .084927 .1642549 0.52 0.605 
  _cons .0301787 .026189 1.15 0.249 
 
Performing a model for Egypt shows a lot of challenge, first because of the strange level 
of integration for , and also because the MCO estimation does not give a satisfactory 
result. We must advise that Egypt had a lot of missing observations, the school variable had 
almost half of the observations missing, that we automatically generated on Stata. We decide 
to perform with the Generalized Linear Model, as this is the most general statistical model 
that we believe may give better estimation.  
Results Interpretation and their economic importance 
The aim of the estimated regression was to check the significance and the sign (positive 
or negative) of two main variables. The first one is the variable of interest of the present 
study , a proxy for industrial development level; this variable is what we have called 
in the course of this study, the long term impact of FDI. Besides, there is the so called stylized 
effect of FDI, that we designed by the short term impact of FDI, this impart can last very 
quickly and whenever this happens without an existing local industrial development, which 
could enhance with foreign firms to generate a competitive market, they FDI impact simply 
wiped out. As we could redefine it at this point of the research, the general hypothesis of this 
study aimed to converge with the belief that the interaction of local industrial development 
and FDI help enhancing the positive impact of FDI on least developed countries. 
The regression specifications are related to some characteristics of each country, then we 
have Morocco and Turkey modeled in the same manner, while Egypt comes out with a 
different model specification. We were unable to predict the sign for , this can be 
positive or negative according to the country, and to the level of FDI it is receiving. Positive 
simply means FDI are a blessing for the country, while negative shows the malign effect. 
This study also tries to show that, the malign effect could mainly be felt on the long term. 
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The first regression for Turkey overwhelmingly show the short term and long term FDI 
effect positive and significant on the country’s growth at 1% and 5% respectively. This 
definitely means Turkey has already caught up or is at the point to do so, then appearing 
with a developed country picture in this study. The effect shows here confirm our intuitions 
that FDI are successful whether they promote competition. However, we see the commercial 
openness with a negative and significant sign. This is certainly due to the fact that trade 
openness comes with a reduction of country revenue and taxes from imported products and 
services. This finding is in the same vein with Yanikkaya (2003)24 findings that trade barriers 
are positively linked to economic growth, so trade openness normally has the negative effect 
that our results pictured out. In his study, he showed that giving more emphasis on trade 
policies than on trade volume25 may conduct to wrong conclusions. We also found school 
impact on growth to have a positive impact but not enough to be significant. In the case of 
Turkey the percentage of enrolment at the tertiary education level appears with no 
significant impact on growth. This may be probably due to the choice of the variable, but we 
couldn’t point out this positive and significant impact. They are many studies portraying the 
effect of education economic growth in Turkey. Most of them use different education levels; 
our findings on education are same with those of Deniz and Dogruel(2008)26 that university 
level (tertiary education) has no impact on economic growth. 
The results from Morocco show a very different picture, and emphasize the difference of 
the development level with Turkey. The FDI impact on short term is showing a positive sign, 
but not significant on growth. The more impressive with the results for Morocco is the 
negative sign we observe for the coefficient of the interaction between industrial 
development level and FDI. This long term impact of FDI although non significant has an 
apparently influence or will have some at long term if suitable actions are not designed. We 
observe while running this research that, the inward FDI has a better coefficient and better 
student statistic alone than when pooled together with the variable for the interaction 
between FDI and country’s industrial development level. We somehow felt this may be 
caused by a possible collinearity among variable, but after checking out, we reject the 
possibility of collinearity as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) obtained after an OLS 
regression was less than 10 and 1/VIF>0.01. We then go forward saying that there is no FDI 
impact in Moroccan economic growth, and that the industrial development level in Morocco 
if any, will be impacted negatively as the amount of FDI will be increasing, this is a case of 
competition destructive FDI instead of competition enhancing. Our findings are supported 
by existing works and statistics showing that the behavior of FDI in Morocco has been for a 
very long time determined by the strategy of privatization initiated by the Government. The 
OECD Investment review (2010) observed however that, „the entry of foreign investors has a 
                                                     
24 Yanikkaya H. 2003. “Trade openness and economic growth: a cross-country empirical 
investigation.” Journal of Development economics, 72(2003) 57-89. 
25 This is using like in our study import and export data for trade volume. Yanikkaya in his trade and 
growth survey, somehow highlighted that, volume variables are better off than policies variable, 
because of the lack of clear definition of trade openness.  
26 Deniz Z., and Dogruel S. 2008. “Desagregated education data and growth: some facts from Turkey 
and MENA countries”. http://www.luc.edu/orgs/meea/volume10/PDFS/PaperbyDeniz&Dogruel.pdf, 
Jel classification J24, O43 
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positive impact on employment and labour skills and facilitates the expansion and internationalization 
of Moroccan enterprises”27. This impact here is mostly the short term which may last quickly, 
this explains probably why we observe a positive impact but non significant. The percentage 
of tertiary school enrolment here as a proxy for the level of instruction showed a positive 
sign, but is not significant at 10% level. North African countries however have a certain level 
of high educated persons, but this may not be enough to boost growth, or their skills are not 
suitable, particularly if this variable effect is to enhance FDI impact. We find trade openness 
coefficient in Morocco also negative and significant. Mansouri (2009)28 found in his study 
that FDI was negative and non significant in Morocco, while he showed that the interaction 
between FDI and trade openness was positive and significant on the country’s growth, the 
real impact of trade openness is still difficult to capture. We pointed earlier in this study that 
the case of openness to European Union of North Africa countries never showed the 
expected positive impacts, outlining mainly a mitigate impact.  
Results from Egypt show exactly the same behavior than the earlier from Morocco. Both 
coefficients for FDI and FDI’s interaction with industrial development are non significant at 
10%. Their signs are exactly the same with those of the Moroccan regression (i.e positive for 
FDI alone and negative for FDI interacting with industrial development level). Only trade 
openness shows a negative and significant coefficient. School is also positive but not 
significant at a 10% level, however, its impact in Egypt is slightly better than in the other 
countries, as we obtained a p-value of 13.7%, while Morocco has for the same coefficient 
22.7% and Turkey 64.4%29. The negative impact of the FDI interacting with industrial 
development level is more relevant in Egypt than in Morocco with respective p-value49.6%, 
and 97.6%. The FDI interaction with industrial development Level can be dropped from the 
regression of Morocco. 
Conclusion and policy review 
We tried to identify the long term impact of Foreign Direct Investment into country’s 
growth. We perform a critical theoretical survey that aims at highlighting the reasons that 
may drive FDI from positively impacting to either zero significant impact or to completely 
negative. We used the Net Outward Investment position of a country to capture the 
industrial development level of a country and its competitive position. To the question 
whether FDI have any impact in Less Developed Countries, we confirm that this is true 
whether we can find both short term and long term positive and significant impacts. This 
means that FDI should further a country’s development on two main points; the first being 
the so called stylized facts and the second one that we identified in this study as the 
interaction between FDI and the local industrial development. Our empirical research find 
                                                     
27 OECD Investment review. 2010. “The role of Foreign Direct Investment in Morocco’s Economic 
Development.” http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-
investment/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-morocco-2010/the-role-of-foreign-direct-investment-in-
morocco-s-economic-development_9789264079618-3-en 
28 Mansouri B. 2009. Effets de l’IDE et de l’ouverture commerciale sur la croissance économique au Maroc. 
29 We should remind that the less the p-value of coefficient, the more the impact is relevant on the 
dependant variable 
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this interaction existing, positive and significant for Turkey, while Morocco and Egypt show 
both no FDI impact on growth and a possibility of FDI malign impact at long term. The 
research regarding FDI impact on growth may still be ongoing as we really don’t know all 
the mechanisms that may help us catching their impacts. However, this study clearly 
underlined one of the most important, that many studies have thought of, to be important 
without being able to prove it empirically. This method may show the impact of FDI on most 
of the developing world to be non significant or even malign in some case. The true from the 
observed facts and statistics can’t be refuted; we barely saw multinationals action in poor 
countries related with their growth. Asian nations are getting out of this short list because of 
their very strong policy commitment toward foreign investors. Foreign direct investments 
don’t enhance growth in poor Less Developed Nations, should these countries continue 
investing their sparse means to attract, and compete with rich one on FDI, probably no. Less 
developed countries should rely on Aid Development Funds to first get a certain local 
industrial development that will be able to reap externalities from multinationals. Those 
local firms will then be part of the industrial realm of the host country, contracting with 
foreigners to provide intermediary services and goods, and any expertise, while learning by 
doing and enhancing managerial knowledge, and some basic technologies. The 
responsibility is not only from Foreign Investors, most of the countries are unable to absorb 
the bulk of foreign capitals, due most of times to the wick industrial level of countries. At 
this point, policies matter, as means to create a better environment and best legislation so 
that foreign direct investments could have defined frameworks for their activities. A foreign 
investor usually enters into contract with host countries, weak negotiations may derive in the 
loss of most expected positive impacts. Country local content of FDI production then seems 
to be unavoidable. 
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Mehanizmi uticaja stranih direktnih investicija na rast manje 
razvijenih zemalja: primeri nivoa industrijskog razvoja 
Turske, Egipta i Maroka  
 
 
REZIME – Nivo industrijskog razvoja koji je predočen u ovom radu je ključni faktor za 
objašnjenje kako se uticaj stranih direktnih investicija (SDI) može promeniti sa pozitivnog na 
negativni. Prikazano je da uloga upliva SDI-a na rast neće imati efekta samo ako se  primene 
odgovarajuće mere, već da mora postojati rast agregatnog nivoa industrijske proizvodnje sa određenog 
minimalnog nivoa. Interakcija između nivoa industrijskog razvoja i SDI može se smatrati kao drugi i 
dugoročni efekat SDI na rast zemlje. Dakle,u nedostatku ili prilikom niskog nivoa industrijskog 
razvoja, može doći do gušenja od strane SDI, što dovodi do pretvaranja interakcije sa pozitivne na 
negativnu, objašnjavajući zašto se u pojedinim zemljama SDI pojavljuje u negativnoj konotaciji sa 
lokalnim razvojem. 
 
   
 Mani, P.E., Mechanisms to Explain FDI Impacts, EA (2013, Vol. 46, No, 3-4, 87-107)
 
107
KLJUČNE REČI: strane direktne investicije, rast, spoljna neto pozicija, nivo industrijskog 
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